PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF TARSKI'S WORK

PATRICK SUPPES
In his published work and even more in conversations, Tarski emphasized what he thought were important philosophical aspects of his work. The English translation of his more philosophical papers [56m] was dedicated to his teacher Tadeusz Kotarbinski, and in informal discussions of philosophy he often referred to the influence of Kotarbinski. Also, the influence of Leiniewski, his dissertation adviser, is evident in his early papers. Moreover, some of his important papers of the 1930s were initially given to philosophical audiences. For example, the famous monograph on the concept of truth ([33"], [35b] ) was first given as two lectures to the Logic Section of the Philosophical Society in Warsaw in 1930. Second, his paper [33] , which introduced the concepts of co-consistency and co-completeness as well as the rule of infinite induction: was first given at the Second Conference of the Polish Philosophical Society in Warsaw in 1927. Also [35c] was based upon an address given in 1934 to the conference for the Unity of Science in Prague; C361 and [36a] summarize an address given at the International Congress of Scientific Philosophy in Paris in 1935. The article [44a] was published in a philosophical journal and widely reprinted in philosophical texts. This list is of course not exhaustive but only representative of Tarski's philosophical interactions as reflected in lectures given to philosophical audiences, which were later embodied in substantial papers. After 1945 almost all of Tarski's publications and presentations are mathematical in character with one or two minor exceptions. This division, occurring about 1945, does not, however, indicate a loss of interest in philosophical questions but is a result of Tarski's moving to the Department of Mathematics at Berkeley. There he assumed an important role in the development of logic within mathematics in the United States.
As is evident to anyone who has read any significant part of Tarski's published writings, he was extraordinarily cautious and careful in giving any direct philosophical interpretation of his work. In contrast, he was in conversation willing to express a much wider range of philosophical opinlons-I know this from my own experience and also from reports of colleagues. On the basis of his extensive publications in set theory, it be expected that he would be a Platonist as far as the foundations of mathe erraed-to my knowledge be never committed himself in print on thi ut certainly in conversation he often expressed skepticism of Platonism and would set forth views that wou1 congenial to formalism in the philosophy of mathernatics and nominalism in general philosophy.
I remember-but now not so well as I would like-the lecture he gave entitled "Reflectio on the present state of set theory" at the Fourth In national Congress ethodology and Philo phy of Science in 1971 in charest, Rumania. was never published.) n this formal occasion Tarski spoke in a more general and speculative manner than he usually would in such circumstances. He expressed a certain skepticism toward the more exotic results such as those on large cardinals. On the other hand, he was firm in the view that elementary set theory would occupy a permanent place in mathematics comparable to that of Euclidean geometry.
Although Tarski was willing to express a number of general views about philosophy in conversation, these views were not advanced in a systematic but unwritten way in seminars, for example, where they could be dissected and argued about. As far as I know, no one has a set of notes recording in paraphrase form conversations about philosophy with Tarski. In any case, 1 certainly do not feel competent myself to attempt anything like a systematic survey of Tarski's unwritten philosophical views. Perhaps someone will corne forward to say more than I can about this aspect of his thought.
I return now to the published work. Although Tarski has a great variety of philosophical comments scattered throughout his writings, I shall confine myself to four topics with respect to which his contributions are of central importance. The first is the methodology of the deductive sciences (or metamathematics), the second the theory of definition, the third semantics and the theory of models, and the fourth the foundations of geometry. Tarski axiomatizes for what I believe to be the first time in the literature the metamathematical notion of consequence. Tarski then defines with this concept available the standard notion of a deductive system as a set of sentences whlch is identical to its set of consequences, and the notions of equivalence, consistency, and completeness are introduced. Not all of these notions that are introduced here were introduced first in their given form by Tarski, but this early article is notable for putting on a clear axiomatic basis general concepts of metamathematics, concepts that have been widely used in philosophical discussions of logic and the foundations of various axiomatic systems.
Tarski begins [3Qe] with the remark that the methodology of the deductive sciences has as its objects the various deductive disciplines, roughly in the same sense that geometry has spatial entities as its objects of investigation. We makes the point here, which he makes repeatedly, that metamathematical investigations are confined do so, the inadequacy of the proof is made manifest. If, however, a theorem is rigorously derived from a set of propositions-the baszc set-the deduction has a value which goes beyond its original purpose. For if, on replacing the geometric terms in the basic set of propositions by certain other terms, true propositions are obtained, then corresponding replacements may be made in the theorem; in this way we obtain new theorems as consequences of the altered basic propositions without having to repeat the proof.
Hilbert's Grundlagen der Geometrie, first edition [ 18971, was written very much in the spirit already well expressed by Pasch, and a similar "abstract" viewpoint toward the foundations of geometry was also further developed by Oswald Veblen and his collaborators just after the turn of the century. The systematic treatise on projective geometry by Veblen and Young C19101 was influential. The first general metamathematical investigations began about this time (Eöwenheim [1915] ) and with the work of Gödel and Tarski reached a new level of development. Tarski acknowledged without any question the revolutionary and fundamental character of Gödel's results [l9311 on consistency and completeness of any sufficiently rich deductive systems.
It is possible to take an even longer historical perspective, by beginning with the first extant discussion we have of any detail of the structure of a deductive science in Aristotle's Posterior analytics. At 76a3 1-77a4, for example, Aristotle distinguishes in a clear way between hypotheses, postulates, and axioms, not that we would today accept in exactly this form what Aristotle has to say. The point is that Tarski's work brings to a certain conclusion what can be regarded as a very long intellectual tradition. The general theory of deductive systems is not now a very active area of research.
Yet I do not mean to suggest that that tradition has ended. There is now a whole new range of questions, generated especially in the last decade, about properties of deductive systems that will take us into a new era. I have in mind such concepts as that of complexity and that of a feasible computation, as two typical examples. (A decision procedure, for instance, is feasible when it is bounded by a polynomial in the length of an expression whose validity is to be decided. Tarski's well-known decision procedure for elementary algebra and geometry is strongly exponential.) Current research will almost surely lead to a new range of methods and applications of the methodology of the deductive sciences, which will be especially important to computer science.
Definitions and definability.
The philosophical bent of Tarski's writings, in contrast to those of many mathematicians interested in the foundations of mathematics, is well exemplified by his several papers on definability. A constructive and characteristic passage of a general character, which forms the opening lines of [31] , is the following:
Mathematicians, in general, do not like to deal with the notion of definability; their attitude toward this notion is one of distrust and reserve. The reasons for this aversion are quite clear and understandable. To begin categorical, but we can certainly enlarge them by adding the standard notion of congruence to obtain Euclidean geometry.
In the concluding paragraph of the article, Tarski uses this theorem to make some interesting remarks about theoretical physics in relation to geometry. He supposes that the axioms of geometry are fixed with respect to that the set of sentences of geometry is, as he puts it, makes the point that there are two ways of buildi would be to define the ts of mechanics, for concepts. If this were le, as he points out, t chanics would simply be a special chapter of ges s he also says, it that this is a feasible approach to mechani e second method, are taken as primitiv ts. Mechanics wo were not categorical, but once the axioms for could so extend them, then mechanics would o course, as mechanics is ordinarily thought of, from categorical and is applied to a great variety of different physical systems. On the other hand, when we think of a global theory of gravitation as in the general theory of relativity we do get the kind of reduction of mechanics to geometry that Tarski referred to, although he does not mention this particular example. The problem with this formulation is that we would ordinarily resist very much the physical meaningfulness of fix the frame of reference in geometry so as to obtain a monotransformable system. physically interesting results of building classical physics on Euclidean geometry come from having the possibility of changing the group of transformations under which the physical system is invariant from being simply the group of similarities. There is a natural relativization of Tarski's results in this area, relativizing them to a given group of transformations, for example, the concept of completeness for Euclidean geometry of the primitive concepts relative to the group of similárities, but as far as I know, this somewhat wider concept was not investigated by Tarski in any later writings.
Tarski does mention in an historical footnote added to C35c-j reference to Beth's important theorem [1953] , which significant~y strengthened Tarski's earlier, much less difficult results on Padoa's method.
There is a tension ln Tarski's work on definition between syntactical methods as in [35c] and set-theoretical methods eliminating all syntactic considerations as in fsl], which is concerned with definable sets of real numbers. Over many years Tarski was concerned to eliminate syntactical or metamathematical methods in favor of purely mathematical or set-theoretical ones. The article f311 was one of the first substantial efforts. The long monograph on cylindric algebras (in two parts, In one way or another a large number of Tarski's papers deal with semantics, especially when we recognize that in one sense all the papers on what we would now call the theory of models can be regarded directly as contributions to semantics. Prior to the extensive work on the theory of models in the late forties and early fifties, the important general semantic subject of modal logic 1s now dominated by semantical methods that in a general form owe much to Tarski. Although Tarski himself was skeptical about the application of systematic semantical methods in the analysis of natural language, one entire conception of the semantics of natural language is baptized as model-theoretic. The influence of Tarski's former student Richard Montague is well known (for a good overview see Montague [1974] ). The important point here is that again methods developed by Tarski in the early 1950s have constituted the general methods used in the extensive analysis of the semantics of natural language from a model-theoretic viewpoint. It would certainly be generally agreed, I think, that a model-theoretic semantics of natural language cannot in itself be entirely adequate. Psychological and computational aspects of language must be considered in giving a fully adequate account, but this is in no way to denigrate the importance that model-theoretic semantics has assumed in the difficult effort to develop an adequate semantics for natural language.
$4. Foundations of geometry. Tarski's work in geometry has been described from a mathematical standpoint in the article by Szczerba [l9861 in this collection. Although my remarks will overlap some with his, I want to emphasize the wideranging philosophical implications of Tarski's work in geometry. I have organized my informal remarks under four headings: the primitive concepts of geometry, the characterization of elementary geometry, metamathematical results in geometry, and the Banach-Tarski paradox.
Geometric primitives. As I hope I made clear in $2, Tarski had a strong interest in considering from a variety of viewpoints the primitive concepts of a theory. Several of his papers in geometry focus on this particular question, but from different viewpoints.
In C291 Tarski took up a theme begun in philosophical works of Whitehead [l9191 and Nicod [1924] , which was to base geometry on the concept of a solid, or as it is sometimes put, on volumes. The intuitive idea is to extract the geometrical aspects of rigid bodies and to use the geometrical solid as the fundamental primitive rather than the concept of a point. Tarski mentions the work of Whitehead and Nicod but says explicitly that he omits a discussion of the philosophical aspects of the problem. What he does that Whitehead and Nicod do not is to show in a completely explicit mathematical way that by using the mereological notion of the relation of part to whole, the only specifically geometrical concept needed is that of a ball. Tarski mentions that this geometry is a special case of Whitehead's method of extensive abstraction.
Tarski returned to the theme of primitive notions for geometry on several occasions. In [56b], written with E. W. Beth, it was shown that equilaterality is sufficient as the only primitive of Euclidean geometry of dimension greater than or equal to three. Tarski published in the same year some general results also on primitive notions of Euclidean geometry in [56c] . A single three-term relation is the smallest primitive basis for Euclidean geometry that can be found, because earlier in a joint article with Lindenbaum [36b] it was shown that no binary relations between that the concept of a natural number is more elementary than the concept of a real number. Yet it is the theory of the former rather than the latter that is undecidable.
Tarski was concern with other metamathematical questions directly relevant to geometry. Some of results on definability were mentioned above. He also published a number of metamathematical results on affine geometry. Roughly speaking, affine geometry is just the geometry that can be built out of the ternary relation of betweenness. In [65a], written jointly with Szczerba, it is shown that the theory of general affine eometry is incom te, undeci~able, and not finitely axiomatizable. It was, I t ink, characteristic Tarski that he very much liked applying general metamathematical notions to particular, indeed often classical, ath he ma tic al theories, of which geometry offers a large number of significant examples.
The ~a~ach-ar ski paradox. In [24d], written~oi~tly with anach, the celebrated anach-Tarski paradox was formulated, which leads to some of the most surprising applications of the axiom of choice in the entire mathematical literature. Banach and Tarski show that by using the axiom of choice a sphere of fixed radius may be decomposed into a nite number of parts, and put together again in such a way as to form two spheres with the given radius. More generally, they show that in threedimensional Euclidean space, two arbitrary bounded sets with interior points are equivalent by finite decomposition; that is, the two sets may be decomposed into the same finite number of disjoint parts with a one-one correspondence of congruence between their respective parts. As the matter is often put, here is a clear case of mathematics violating physical reality in the sense that we certainly do not believe that anything like these decompositions can actually be carried out in real space. The very existence of these paradoxical results has often been used in the past to argue against the admissibility of the axiom of choice. That the Banach-Tarski paradox is still a topic for active research in connection with a number of significant open problems is to be seen in the publication of a recent book devoted entirely to it (Wagon [1985] ). In fact, one of the significant problems that is still open is one posed by Tarski in 1925: is a circle (with its interior) equidecomposable with a square of the same area?-shades of the ancient Greek problem, in new guise, of squaring the circle. feel this partial survey of the philosophical lications of Tarski's work uld be essentially incomplete if I did not try to express in a general way an aspect of his work that is as important as any other. In the various matters I have reviewed above 1 have, as is customary, concentrated on a variety of substantive results. In Tarski's case especially, it is at least as important to emphasize the clarity of his writings. His extrao nary ability to organize the exposition of complicated topics in a lucid way, r cted directly in the choice of concepts, notation and sequences of to ics, is what makes them seem easier than they redly are. More important, they serve as a vivid model of how foundational matters should be talked about and written about. (Giidel's papers constitute a different, less formal but equally valuable model of clarity.) The second related point is an empirical claim I would make. I will not try to substantiate it, but I think that I 
